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Abstract The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable
in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individu-
ality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical
mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a
sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition
that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a ‘quantum connection’ stubbornly
persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here
we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative
solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right per-
spective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle
identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we de-
velop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as
long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the
paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical
(anti-)symmetrization postulates.
Keywords indistinguishability · Gibbs paradox · identity · identical particles
PACS 03.65+b
1 Introduction
Questions about identity and distinguishability in modern physics have their ori-
gin in thermodynamics and statistical physics. In particular, the notorious Gibbs
paradox raises the question of exactly when two gases can be considered as being
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2of the same kind, and what consequences this sameness has for thermodynamical
properties, in particular entropy values. There is a persistent, though controversial
and contested, claim in the literature that a fully satisfactory solution of the Gibbs
paradox can only be achieved in quantum mechanics, via the way quantum me-
chanics deals with ‘identical particles’. Evidently, the background of this claim
is the conviction that there exists a relation between quantum indistinguishability
and ‘lack of particle identity’ on the one hand, and the thermodynamical mixing
with which the Gibbs paradox is concerned on the other (see for a sketch of the
general background of these ideas, e.g., [8]).
In this article we shall first look at the definition of the entropy of mixing,
in order to emphasize the essential role of pragmatic considerations in the Gibbs
paradox (in contradistinction to fundamental considerations about particle iden-
tity). We also aim to show that existing discussions of the Gibbs paradox have
usually not gone to the heart of the matter or are simply wrong. Finally, we demon-
strate that the Gibbs paradox can be formulated even in the context of quantum
mechanical systems consisting of ‘identical particles’.
2 Identity and distinguishability in thermodynamics: the Gibbs paradox
Traditional thermodynamics deals with macro systems in thermal equilibrium—
a paradigmatic case is a gas in a container, whose volume V can be changed by
means of a piston and to which heat can be supplied by contact with a heat bath.
The thermodynamic state of the gas (which we here will write as a function of its
pressure P and temperature T ) will be changed when we vary the volume and/or
supply heat. If this is done in such a gradual way that the gas can be consid-
ered to be in equilibrium at each instant, the change is called reversible. It is now
borne out by experience that the quantity
∫ 2
1 dQ/T , i.e. the supplied heat divided
by the temperature, integrated along a reversible path from state 1 to state 2 in
the macroscopic state space parametrized by P and T , is independent of the path
between 1 and 2. This means that a state function, the entropy S, can be defined
such that S(P2,T2)− S(P1,T1) =
∫ 2
1 dQ/T . Further, energy conservation implies
dQ−PdV = dE. Given that the energy E of an ideal classical gas consisting of N
atoms is given by E = 32 NkT + const , we find
dQ
T
=
5
2
Nkd(ln T )−Nkd(lnP).
So the entropy of an ideal gas is determined as
S(P,T ) = 5
2
Nk lnT −Nk lnP+C. (1)
The above derivation, starting from experimental facts, does not completely fix
the number C: C does not depend on the values of P and T of our system, but
may depend on anything else, and may in principle be taken as different when we
go from one system to another, as van Kampen ([10]) emphasizes. Nevertheless,
there exist natural choices for C: it is eminently reasonable and convenient to take
the same value of C for all systems that consist of equal amounts of the same gas,
and also to take the entropy of a system that is formed by juxtaposing (without
3thermal contact or other interaction) two thermodynamical systems as the sum
of the individual entropies, so that the entropy becomes additive ([10, p. 305]).
This goes beyond direct empirical regularities, since these only show additivity of
entropy differences.
Combining two volumes of the same ideal gas into one volume can be done by
a reversible process in which no heat is exchanged (namely, by slowly removing
a partition). This, plus the just-mentioned conventions about the constants in the
entropy expressions, implies the extensivity of the entropy of ideal gases: before
the removal of the partition the total entropy is double the entropy of each of the
individual systems (by virtue of additivity) and this value does not change during
the reversible removal of the partition, since dQ = 0 during this process.1 So the
consideration of reversible processes in which N changes makes it possible to say
more about the N-dependence of S than what is already contained in (1). The
formula for the entropy of an ideal gas now becomes
S(P,T,N) = 5
2
Nk lnT −Nk lnP+ cN (2)
in which the new constant c does not depend on P, T or N but may still depend on
other things, like the kind of gas that is being considered ([10, p. 306]).
This derivation of the extensivity of the entropy of ideal gases highlights that
in order to apply the formula dS =
∫
dQ/T it is necessary to consider processes
by means of which the number of particles can be varied in a reversible way:
it would be impossible to derive an N-dependence of the entropy from merely
studying the thermodynamical properties of closed systems. Further, as we have
seen, the full dependence of the entropy on N does not follow immediately from
experimental results (which give us only entropy differences) but needs a choice
of constants. This warns us that if we are going to seek a microscopic counterpart
of the thermodynamical entropy expression, we should focus on △S rather than
on S itself. It is not to be expected that in statistical mechanics there exists a
fundamental and unique justification for the absolute value of S, if the task of
statistical mechanics is to reproduce empirical results; the freedom in S that we
encounter in thermodynamics should also be present in statistical mechanics.
A further comment is that obviously even the slowest removal of a partition be-
tween two ideal gases of the same kind will lead to violent processes on the micro-
scale: atoms will suddenly have more space available to them and will escape from
their original volume. If the two gases are not of the same chemical sort, the re-
sulting mixing of particles from the two volumes will show itself by changes that
count as thermodynamically observable and the process will count as irreversible.
Such an irreversible process will increase the entropy even if dQ = 0. But if the
two gases are chemically speaking the same, the mixing will not be detectable by
looking at the usual thermodynamical quantities. This is so because in thermody-
namics we restrict ourselves to the consideration of coarse-grained macroscopic
quantities, and this entitles us to describe the mixing of two volumes of gases
of the same kind, with equal P and T , as reversible with no increase in entropy.
But if we think of what happens in terms of the motions of individual atoms or
molecules, the two processes (irreversible and reversible mixing) are completely
1 See ([11] for a discussion of the consequences of choosing conventions that do not make
the entropy extensive.
4similar. In other words, the qualification of the mixing process as irreversible or
reversible, and the verdict that the entropy does or does not change, possesses a
pragmatic dimension. It depends on what we accept as legitimate methods of dis-
crimination ([10]): chemical differences lead to acknowledged thermodynamical
entropy differences in a process of mixing, whereas mere differences in where
particles come from do not.
Indeed, in the case of two chemically different ideal gases, the description
on the level of thermodynamics permits that the gases can be effectively distin-
guished: it is assumed, as part of the thermodynamical framework, that semi-
permeable membranes exist that are transparent to one gas but stop the particles
of the other. A reversible mixing process can now be defined via the familiar pro-
cedure in which such membranes are slowly moved, while the gas whose atoms
or molecules cannot pass is exerting a pressure on the membrane. Calculation of
the work that is done and the heat that has to flow in in order to keep the temper-
ature constant leads to the familiar result that the mixing results in an increase in
entropy. The value of this ‘entropy of mixing’ is independent of the difference be-
tween the two gases, and remains the same when (in thought) we make the gases
more and more similar. For two equal initial volumes V of ideal gases, each with
the same P and T and each with N atoms, which are mixed so that they are both
contained in one volume 2V , the increase of entropy is given by
Smix = 2kN ln2. (3)
That (3) does not gradually vanish when the gases become more and more similar
is one form of the Gibbs paradox.
The reason that the entropy of mixing does not diminish when two gases be-
come more and more similar is readily understandable from the above. The deriva-
tion of Eq. (3) as we sketched it has as its premise that the two gases can be re-
versibly mixed and separated by some device, for example a set of semi-permeable
membranes. If this premise is granted, the outcome (3) follows from calculating∫
dQ/T during the process. However, as soon as this premise is dropped, i.e. as
soon as we no longer assume the availability of an effective discrimination tech-
nique, no increase of thermodynamical entropy will be found. The discontinuous
transition from 2kN ln2 to 0 thus reflects the discontinuous step from considering
two things as distinguishable to considering them as indistinguishable—there is
nothing mysterious about this.
Continuing our earlier comment about the difference between irreversible and
reversible, we stress again that this Gibbs discontinuity contains a pragmatic ele-
ment. If we decided to follow individual particles on their trajectories, we could
in principle build semi-permeable membranes that could distinguish between par-
ticles coming from the two initial volumes, even if the gases are chemically equal.
With the help of such devices we could verify the presence of an entropy of mix-
ing Smix = 2kN ln2 ([4]) even in this case. Such devices would have to make use of
a kind of Maxwellian demons: little instruments that should calculate for each ap-
proaching atom or molecule whether it initially came from volume 1 or 2. Depend-
ing on the result of this calculation, the atom/molecule should be stopped or not.
Of course, the consideration of membranes equipped with such microscopic tools
or Maxwellian demons falls outside the area of competence of traditional thermo-
dynamics. But this is exactly the point: it is our decision to confine ourselves to
5the consideration of traditional thermodynamical quantities that is responsible for
the disappearance of effects of mixing in the case of gases of the same chemical
kind.
The discontinuous vanishing of the entropy of mixing in thermodynamics
therefore does not correspond to some indistinguishability in principle, on the
level of the particles described by fundamental microscopic physics. Indeed, if we
transcend the boundaries of thermodynamics it is possible, within the conceptual
framework of classical physics, to recover an analogue of the entropy of mixing
even when thermodynamics tells us that there is no such entropy. It follows that
the presence or absence of a thermodynamical entropy of mixing does not teach us
anything definitive about microscopic distinguishability and identity. These sim-
ple considerations, which in principle are well known, already indicate that at-
tempts to connect the Gibbs paradox to issues of fundamental distinguishability
and identity, perhaps relating to quantum mechanics, are misguided.
3 Identity and distinguishability in statistical mechanics
One of Boltzmann’s seminal ideas was that in statistical mechanics the thermody-
namical entropy relates to the ‘thermodynamical probability’ W of a macro-state,
viz. the number of micro-states compatible with the macro-state in question di-
vided by the total number of micro-states. Boltzmann used a formula for entropy
differences, of the form ([5, p. 176])
S2−S1 = k ln W2W1 , (4)
in accordance with the fact that in thermodynamics only entropy differences have
direct empirical significance—as we have seen, the absolute value of the entropy
depends on our choice of constants. However, in the later literature Eq. (4) has
usually been replaced by the formula
S = k lnW, (5)
with W the number of micro-states. Ehrenfest and Trkal ([5, p. 176]) ascribe the
predominance of formula (5) to the influence of Planck’s work. Eq. (5) has the
advantage that it is simple and corresponds to a natural choice of constants. How-
ever, because it applies to a closed system, it tends to obscure the fact that also
in statistical mechanics we can only learn something about the entropy’s depen-
dence on any particular quantity if we investigate processes in which the quantity
in question can vary—such processes will tell us how the entropy changes when
the variable changes. In particular, S’s dependence on N must be studied in situa-
tions in which the number of particles can vary.
If we have two equal volumes of ideal gases of the same kind, both in internal
thermal equilibrium at P and T , with a partition between them, application of Eq.
(5) leads to the result that the total entropy is double the value of the individual
entropies (since the total number of microstates is the product of the numbers
of microstates of the individual systems, if there are no microscopic correlations
between the systems). Equation (5) therefore embodies the standard choice of
constants that makes the entropy additive. When we remove the partition, however,
6Eq. (5) does not produce the expected result that the combined entropy is double
the value of each of the entropies of the single systems. Indeed, if the number of
microstates in each of the single volumes of ideal gas at P and T is W , the number
of microstates in the combined volume is not W 2 but rather
W 2
2N!
N!N! , (6)
in which the combinatorial factor represents the number of ways the 2N atoms
can be distributed over the two volumes after the partition has been taken out (we
assume N to be very large in this calculation and similar ones, so that the total
number of states can be taken as equal to the number of states of the equilibrium
situation).
The presence of this combinatorial factor comes from the fact that we can
distinguish and follow in time each one of the individual particles, so that we can
tell whether it originated in the left or right compartment. Before the partition
was removed the total number of microstates was W 2, but after the removal each
configuration can be realized in more ways because particles from the left can
now occupy positions at the right, and vice versa. We see why the existence of
trajectories is important here: by their trajectories we can distinguish atoms from
volume 1 from those originating from volume 2, also after the mixing. In the
case of classical particles this assumption of distinguishability via trajectories is
of course always satisfied. Now, if we use S = k lnW to calculate the entropy of
the combined gas volumes, this gives us a value of the entropy after mixing of
2k lnW + k ln 2N!
N!N! = 2k lnW +2kN ln2, (7)
where Stirling’s approximation has been used. We see that an entropy of mixing
appears, just as in Eq. (3). This leads to a variation on the original Gibbs paradox:
the statistical treatment, unlike the thermodynamical approach, doesn’t make the
entropy of mixing vanish even when the two gases are of the same chemical kind.
A familiar strategy here is to let this unexpected entropy growth go away by
inserting a factor 1/N! in the expression for W . This manoeuvre removes the en-
tropy of mixing when we use formula (5), so that the entropy becomes extensive.
Instead of k lnW for each of the two individual volumes before mixing we now
have k lnW/N!, and for the entropy of the combined system after mixing we find
k ln(W 2. 2N!
N!N!
.
1
2N!
),
which is exactly double the entropy of each of the original volumes. So introduc-
ing the additional factor 1/N! in all entropy formulas removes the Gibbs paradox
in its second version.
4 The factor 1/N!
In order to decide whether, and if so in what respect, we have come closer to a
solution of the paradox, we should first of all pay attention to the objection that
the division of the number of microstates by N! is ad hoc and mysterious—a
7criticism that has been discussed in the literature since Gibbs’s days. There is a
traditional reply here, going back to Gibbs himself and to Planck (see [5,10,8]
for references to the original literature), in which this division is defended by an
appeal to the fundamental indistinguishability of the atoms (or other particles) that
are involved.2
A recent example of this line of argument is Saunders’s observation that in
many-particles states of particles of the same kind permutations of the particle
labels do not lead to a new physical situation ([8]). From the viewpoint of what
can be ascertained empirically, classical particles are individuated solely by their
physical properties, and it does not make any difference how we distribute indices
over them. We can therefore without any loss of physical information go over to
the reduced phase space, in which all states that can be transformed into each other
by permutations of indices are identified: the different assignments of particle la-
bels do not correspond to empirical differences and can therefore be considered to
represent unnecessary surplus theoretical structure. So we can get by with a phase
space whose number of states is a factor N! smaller than if we count all permuted
states as different. According to Saunders this observation justifies the insertion
of a factor 1/N! in the number of states, which in turn solves the Gibbs paradox.
It is certainly true that in this sense classical particles with the same intrinsic
properties (mass, charge, etc.) are indistinguishable or permutable (as Saunders
calls them); this permutability expresses that labels do not carry physical meaning
over and above the physical properties of the particles. For example, two widely
separated electrons, following distinct trajectories and labeled 1 and 2, still rep-
resent exactly the same physical situation after we have exchanged labels (in the
sense that the electron at the first position is now called electron 2, and vice versa).
But this example also immediately demonstrates the physical insignificance of this
type of indistinguishability: in spite of the exchangeability of the labels, the parti-
cles themselves can clearly be distinguished physically—we could easily tell them
apart by a detection device that is sensitive to positions. So it seems that this per-
mutability argument, and division by N! on its basis, only relates to our mode of
description and does not possess physical import. This division by N! cannot pos-
sibly lead to different predictions; which makes it highly implausible that it could
be relevant for a solution of the Gibbs paradox. We shall return to this in more
detail in a moment, after having discussed another explanation for 1/N!.
This alternative approach looks more promising from a physical point of view
because it starts from a consideration of open systems. It can thus take into ac-
count the argument that as long as one stays with Eq. (5) and applies it to closed
systems, it is impossible to justify any functional relation between variations in S
and variations in N at all ([5, §9]). We should switch to processes in which N may
change ([5,10]) in order to study entropy changes that are due to changes in N.
For this purpose we consider an ideal gas in a volume V1 that is brought into
contact with an ideal gas of the same kind in a volume V2. If we assume the kind of
randomness that is at the basis of statistical mechanics, the probability of having
N1 particles in subsystem 1 and N2 = N−N1 particles in subsystem 2 (with N the
2 In the later literature quantum mechanics and the symmetrization postulates for states of
‘identical quantum particles’ are frequently invoked as the final justification.
8fixed total number of particles) will be given by the binomial distribution
P(N1,N2) =
N!
N1!N2!
(
V1
V
)N1(
V2
V
)N2 . (8)
The particle number N1 is now no longer a constant but has become a stochas-
tic variable, which makes it possible to consider the change in probability and, by
taking the logarithm, the change in entropy when N1 varies. For example, if we let
N → ∞, V2 → ∞, while N/(V1 +V2) is finite and constant, we find for the change
of entropy of a system in contact with an infinite reservoir of particles:
△S =△ ln 1
N1!
(
V1
V
)N1 . (9)
There thus appears a factor 1/N1! in the probability and entropy, and this time this
factor is derived instead of posited. The factor is due—via the binomial coefficient
in the probability distribution—to the multiplicity of ways in which N1 atoms can
be chosen from a total of N atoms. For this multiplicity to make sense it must
be assumed that on the microscopic level of statistical mechanics the atoms are
distinguishable: it must make a difference which set of atoms is selected from the
total number of atoms N.
A typical example of application of Eq. (8) is the case in which a volume
V1 with N ideal gas atoms is brought into contact with a larger volume V2 that
is empty. As soon as the partition is taken away, a situation arises which is not
a thermodynamical equilibrium: since the probability (8) is very sharply peaked
around N1 = NV1/(V1 +V2), as a result of random motion a new equilibrium will
be established in which the gas is (approximately) uniformly distributed over the
total volume V1 +V2 (this is the essence of the second law in its probabilistic
version). If V1 =V2, the associated change in entropy is, from Eq. (4):
△S = k ln N!
(N/2)!2 2
−N = kN ln2. (10)
If we start with a volume V1 filled with NA atoms of ideal gas A, and a volume
V2 =V1 with NB = NA atoms of ideal gas B, we find, analogously, for the entropy
change when a partition between the gases is removed: 2kNA ln2 = 2kNB ln2. This
is exactly the entropy of mixing (3) that thermodynamics predicts for this case.
If, however, we begin with two volumes with atoms of the same gas, the situa-
tion immediately after the removal of the partition is already a state of maximum
probability according to Eq. (8). In this case there will consequently be no in-
crease in entropy, in accordance with the thermodynamical result. So Eq. (8), with
its factors 1/N!, appears to take away our Gibbs worries.
5 Do the justifications for 1/N! really solve the Gibbs paradox?
Although it is a frequent claim in the literature that division of the entropy expres-
sion by N! because of fundamental indistinguishability or permutability of parti-
cles (the first justification reviewed above) justifies discarding the Gibbs paradox,
it is not difficult to see that this is incorrect. The reason is that transition to the
9reduced phase space, so that all insignificant permutations among particles of the
same kind are factored out, should involve a division by N! in which N stands for
all particles of the same kind. For example, in the initial unmixed Gibbs situation,
with the partition in place and with atoms of the same kind on both sides, N should
refer to the total number of atoms on both sides of the partition: it clearly does not
make any physical difference when we exchange labels across the partition.3 But
this implies that we correct the multiplicity of states by the same numerical fac-
tor, both before and after the removal of the partition. All entropy changes will
therefore be exactly the same as when we do not make these corrections at all.
In other words, division by N! on the basis of fundamental indistinguishability or
permutability of particles of the same kind only affects the absolute value of the
entropy, of which we have already seen that it is without empirical significance.
This division is not sensitive to changes in the situation like the removal of a par-
tition or other mechanisms of mixing—it is therefore completely irrelevant to the
Gibbs paradox.
The justification of 1/N! via making N variable, and applying the binomial
distribution, certainly looks more promising in this respect: here the division is
not by a constant, but by the variable number of particles in a given volume. The
idea of this derivation of 1/N! was first proposed by Ehrenfest and Trkal ([5]), in
the early 1920-s. It is not as well known as it should be (but see the exposition
by van Kampen ([10]); Swendsen has recently proposed a similar approach ([9])).
Authors who comment on this justification for the occurrence of 1/N! in statisti-
cal mechanics expressions often create the impression that it provides a definitive
solution of the Gibbs paradox within the framework of classical physics, by deriv-
ing the division by 1/N! from standard probability theory.4 However, as we shall
argue, this claim rests on a misinterpretation of the significance of the factor 1/N!
that is thus derived.
The examples at the end of the previous section of the application of the
Ehrenfest-Trkal method to the mixing of gases already suffice to make the essence
of the situation clear. If two unequal gases are allowed to mix, there is no equi-
librium immediately after the removal of the partition, because the probability of
the particle number is not at its maximum value. This means that a more probable
situation will be established, in accordance with the second law in its statistical
version. However, in the case of two equal gases (at the same pressure and tem-
perature) there is an equilibrium, and nothing will change. It is this difference that
is responsible for the presence or absence of an entropy of mixing in the examples.
Where does this difference come from? Not from the binomial distribution or the
1/N! in it, but from our decision to look only at the number of particles of a partic-
ular chemical kind, without asking the question from where these particles came
(from the left or right compartment). In the case of two chemically equal gases
we decide not to follow the atoms from the left compartment, so that we renounce
the possibility to identify them as different from atoms coming from the right;
but this identification is exactly what we took for granted in the case of unequal
3 Actually, we should in principle divide by the number of all particles of the same kind in
the whole universe—this does not make a difference for our point about the irrelevance of this
division made in the text. Compare also the later discussion of 1/N! in quantum mechanics.
4 Saunders ([8]) says that both the permutability argument and the Ehrenfest-Trkal argument
provide a solution for the classical Gibbs paradox, and that quantum indistinguishability does
the same for quantum particles. Our conclusion here will be that all three claims are wrong.
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gases (in which case the task is easy because of the chemical difference). There is
a good reason for not bothering about the origin of chemically identical particles:
the remaining differences are undetectable by the methods allowed in thermody-
namics. As we discussed in the context of the Gibbs paradox in thermodynamics,
we would leave the domain of thermodynamics if we were going to follow the
individual trajectories of particles in order to detect the effects of mixing chemi-
cally equal gases. But this reason for the disappearance of the mixing entropy has
nothing to do with the appearance of 1/N! in the binomial distribution.
Indeed, exactly the same situation arises when we work with the formula
S = k lnW without taking into account the 1/N! factor. As we know, in the case
of unequal gases we find that there is an entropy of mixing, due to the increase
in possibilities for the individual atoms of gases A and B. After the removal of
the partition each atom now has twice the number of available microstates it had
before, which leads to an additional entropy of Smix = k ln22N = 2Nk ln2. In the
case of equal gases we find this same value if we still consider all microstates
as different—this is what leads to the Gibbs paradox in its second version. But
if we pause and think about what is relevant to thermodynamics, we recognize
that exchanges of atoms between the left and right compartments, although phys-
ically real, no longer lead to thermodynamically detectable differences in the case
of chemically equal gases. So we can safely diminish the total number of states,
dividing by 22N in our calculation—not because there is no additional phase vol-
ume made available by taking the partition out, but because this additional phase
volume cannot be made visible and usable by means of thermodynamical tech-
niques. Fundamental ‘ontological’ identity and indistinguishability do not play a
role here.
Therefore, the Ehrenfest-Trkal binomial factor does not do any work in the
solution of the Gibbs paradox. The crucial step that is responsible for the disap-
pearance of Smix is the assumption that in the case of the mixing of two gases of
the same kind we are not going to distinguish between atoms coming from V1 and
atoms coming from V2. In mathematical terms, the disappearance of the mixing
entropy is not due to the introduction of the coefficient NA!NB!/NA1!NA2!NB1!NB2!
in the formula for the probability of the distribution of the particles of sorts A and
B over the compartments 1 and 2, but rather to our decision to replace this coef-
ficient by (2N)!/(N!)2 in the case of gases A and B of the same kind. From the
point of view of fundamental physics or mathematics there is nothing that com-
pels us to take this step: the atoms from V1 and V2 are distinguishable entities and
(N!)2/(N/2)!2 (the binomial factor appearing in the initial entropy for unequal
gases if NA = NB = N) is simply numerically unequal to (2N)!/(N!)2 (the factor
for equal gases). What has happened here is that we have decided to discard ex-
changes of atoms between the two volumes. In the case of unequal gases these
exchanges would count as changes of the total thermodynamical state—but if the
gases are of the same kind they are considered irrelevant. So everything hinges on
what we define as the thermodynamical state or changes in this state—and not on
fundamental microscopic considerations about distinguishability and identity.
What, then, is the background of the idea that it is an undeniable fact that the
Ehrenfest-Trkal derivation of 1/N! solves the Gibbs paradox? This comes from the
misconception that the Ehrenfest-Trkal argument shows that W , in the formula S=
klogW , should in all circumstances be divided by N!—as we have seen in section
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3, this division would indeed remove the entropy of mixing, as a mathematical
fact. But for this we need to redefine not only the entropies of the two mixing gas
volumes, but also the entropy of the total system. Going back to the example at
the end of section 3, to define away the entropy of mixing it is necessary that the
entropy of the total system, consisting of 2N particles, is divided by (2N!). But the
Ehrenfest-Trkal argument did not imply anything about the N-dependence of this
total entropy. Indeed, the total number of particles is constant in the Ehrenfest-
Trkal argument, and not subject to any probability considerations. So there is no
justification here at all for dividing the total number of states by 2N!.5
So we see that the justification of 1/N! as proposed by Ehrenfest and Trkal
does nothing to solve the Gibbs paradox6; the conceptual situation remains exactly
as it was.
6 Quantum mechanics
It is a central principle of quantum mechanics that a many-particles state of ‘iden-
tical particles’ (particles of the same kind) must be completely symmetric or anti-
symmetric under permutations of particle indices. This implies that the state does
not change under permutations (except for a minus sign in the case of fermions),
so that all probabilities and expectation values remain the same. This is what is
meant by particle indistinguishability in the context of quantum mechanics: per-
mutations of labels do not lead to a new physical situation.
At first sight this symmetry property of quantum states appears important for
the Gibbs paradox, because it provides us with factors 1/N! at places that seem
exactly right.7 Instead of N! distinct product states, differing from each other
by permutations of particle labels, we now have only one symmetrical or anti-
symmetrical state.
But this reasoning based on counting of quantum states is spurious. To see
why, note first that in the case of two different gases the expressions for the
thermodynamic probabilities are multiplied by 1/NA! and 1/NB!—but this is a
multiplication by constants, which only leads to the addition of a constant to the
entropy. All entropy differences remain the same in this case; in particular, the en-
tropy of mixing is exactly the same as in calculations without consideration of the
symmetrization postulates. In the case of gases of the same kind, the factor that
5 Swendsen ([9]) attempts to avoid this conclusion by an appeal to counterfactual reasoning:
if the total system were to enter into contact with another system, its number of particles would
become variable and subject to a probability distribution. But such counterfactual reasoning has
no explanatory force for the actual case of the Gibbs paradox, in which the total system is closed.
6 This is not to deny that the Ehrenfest-Trkal approach constitutes an essential step forward
in the context of problems in which particle numbers can change, for example the study of
dissociation equilibria!
7 The factors appearing in quantum statistics are actually a bit more complicated. Suppose we
are considering a system of N particles, with X one-particle states available to them. Classical
counting leads to XN possible states for the N-particle system, if we assume that each one-
particle state can be occupied by more than one particle. The number of quantum states for
bosons is (N +X − 1)!/N!(X − 1)!, which reduces to XN/N! if X ≫ N but in any case is a
constant as long as N does not change—this is the essential point for the argument in the text.
In the case of fermions the number of states is X!/N!(X −N)!, which also reduces to XN/N! if
X ≫ N and is also constant when N does not vary.
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comes from the quantum counting is 1/(2N)! (for simplicity we again consider
the case with equal amounts of gas, with a total number of 2N particles). But as
before, multiplication of W by this constant value only leads to the addition of
a constant to the entropy, and the entropy of mixing is unaffected. So the intro-
duction of factors that come from counting the number of quantum states does
not have consequences for the calculation of the entropy of mixing, and the Gibbs
paradox remains exactly what it was. This argument exactly mirrors the argument
from the previous section about the physical insignificance of ‘permutability’ in
classical mechanics.
What then, is the background of the wide-spread conviction that quantum the-
ory automatically solves the Gibbs paradox? This belief comes from an incorrect
application of the (anti-)symmetrization postulates. According to this flawed rea-
soning, the number of states in each of the two compartments before mixing, with
the partition in place, is assumed to be given by XN/N!, with X the number of
available one-particle states, whereas for the total number of states after mixing
(2X)2N/(2N)! is taken. In other words, the symmetrization rule is first applied to
each volume separately, and then, after the removal of the partition, to the com-
plete volume as one whole. But this way of counting is in conflict with what the
symmetrization postulates require! These postulates require (anti-)symmetrization
of the total state of identical particles, even when the partition is still present. So
what made the entropy of mixing go away in the criticized argument was not the
quantum counting of states, but the different ways of applying the symmetriza-
tion postulates before and after the removal of the partition. If we apply the sym-
metrization postulates correctly, it is immediately clear that they cannot have con-
sequences for the entropy of mixing as long as the total number of particles of the
same kind is constant.
The often made mistake that we just identified has its origin in the rule of
thumb that we do not need to (anti)symmetrize if particle wave functions do not
overlap. The quantum states on different sides of the partition do not overlap in
very good approximation, and our classical intuition even tells us that they do not
overlap at all (which is false because the wave functions have infinite tails). So it
might appear that we do not need to symmetrize the total wave function of all the
particles in the container, as long as the partition is in place.
But this rule of thumb is indeed precisely a rule of thumb, a pragmatic rule
justified by the fact that for the expectation values of certain (namely local) ob-
servables it does not make a difference whether we symmetrize or not in the case
of non-overlapping wave-packets. From a more fundamental point of view sym-
metrization is always necessary, and any failure to symmetrize the complete state
would in principle show up in wrong predictions if expectation vales of arbitrary
many-particles observables are considered (see, e.g., [7, Vol. II, sec. XIV.8]), [1,
Vol. 2, pp. 1406-1408]). Indeed, on second thought it would be miraculous if the
insertion or removal of a partition between two volumes of particles of the same
kind would have instantaneous consequences for the symmetry properties of the
total wave function! Symmetrization should always involve the total number of
particles of the same kind, and this makes symmetrization completely irrelevant
to the Gibbs paradox.
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7 Identity, distinguishability and permutability
In the thermodynamical Gibbs paradox the essential point proved to be whether
we are actually able to distinguish the gases coming from two different compart-
ments. If we possess semi-permeable membranes, or a similar device that responds
differently to the two gases, we will be able to verify experimentally that there is a
mixing entropy—and if we do not discriminate between the gases, we will not en-
counter this entropy. The latter statement is true even if in principle it is possible to
make a distinction; although in this case more refined instruments would of course
identify an entropy of mixing after all. As we argued, this remains true if the gases
are chemically the same. In this case we have to invoke the help of very refined
instruments, or Maxwellian demons, and this admittedly leads us outside of ther-
modynamics. But the point of principle remains that the absence or presence of an
entropy of mixing does not correspond to the presence or absence of fundamental
identity or (in)distinguishability of the gases, but rather to the applicability of a
discrimination criterion chosen by us.
The situation is not different in Ehrenfest’s and Trkal’s treatment of the statisti-
cal background of the N-dependence of the entropy. Also here, the mixing entropy
is there if we take the gases as different, and use a factor N!/NA!NB! in the calcu-
lation of the probabilities, and it is not there if the gases are treated as being of the
same kind, in which case we use a factor N!/(NA +NB)! = N!/N! = 1. Again, the
formulas do not dictate which option to choose.
The question naturally arises of whether everything is a matter of our choice
and Nature has no say in this at all. Isn’t there some point at which it becomes
impossible in principle to distinguish A and B atoms, whatever tools we use? In
this case we could say that there is no mixing, and no entropy of mixing, in a fully
objective sense.
In classical physics we can always find out, in principle, from where a parti-
cle came because of the existence of trajectories. It is therefore plausible to look
to quantum mechanics if we want to find indistinguishability in principle; more-
over, folklore teaches us that identical quantum particles are really fundamentally
indistinguishable. In the previous section we have seen what this actually means
mathematically: the permutation of ‘particle indices’ does not lead to a physi-
cally different many-particles state. Take, for example, the case of two fermions
described by two mutually orthogonal one-particle states |ψ〉1 and |φ〉2. The prod-
uct state is excluded by the anti-symmetrization postulate, which says that instead
the total state should be
|Ψ〉= 1√
2
(|φ〉1|ψ〉2−|ψ〉1|φ〉2), (11)
so that permutation of the indices only entails a change of sign. Does this state tell
us that we are dealing with particles that cannot be distinguished?
That depends on how we assume that particles are represented in Eq. (11). If
we think that the labels 1 and 2 refer to particles, as a kind of particle name, then
we find (via partial tracing) that these particles are in exactly the same state and
posses exactly the same properties in the total state (11). But that is not at all how
Eq. (11) is normally interpreted in the practice of physics! The usual interpretation
of Eq. (11) is that it represents a situation in which we have one particle in state
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|ψ〉1 and one in state |φ〉2, respectively. In other words, in practice the concept of a
particle is not connected to the indices in the formalism, and the associated partial
trace states, but by the one-particle states occurring in the total state—this also
gives the correct classical particle limit (see for more detail and argument about
this line of thought [2,3,6]).
This distinction between different ways of implementing the concept of a par-
ticle makes a difference for how the Gibbs situation should be understood in quan-
tum mechanics. Assume that |ψ〉1 is a state that is localized in the left compart-
ment in a Gibbs experiment, and |φ〉2 a state localized in the right compartment.
If we uncritically follow the tradition of thinking of the labels as directly refer-
ring to particles, we have to accept that particle 1 is delocalized, spread out over
both compartments—and that particle 2 is in exactly the same predicament. In this
case, both particles are in the same mixed state
W =
1
2
(|φ〉〈φ |+ |ψ〉〈ψ|).
These particles will be indistinguishable: there will be no instruments that can
tell them apart and even Maxwellian demons will be powerless to discriminate
between 1 and 2.
But as already mentioned, this interpretation of what a particle is fails to make
contact with the practice of physics and the ordinary meaning of ‘particle’. In re-
ality, Eq. (11) would typically be used to represent the situation in which there is
one particle in the left compartment, and one in the right compartment—the sym-
metry of the state indicates that the label has no physical significance, but this does
not imply that the difference between the one-particle states is physically insignifi-
cant. If we accept this alternative way of looking at the situation, in which particles
are associated with one particle states rather than with indices, the situation with
respect to the Gibbs paradox turns out to be not basically different from what it
was in classical mechanics: a Maxwellian demon will be able to distinguish the
state |ψ〉1 from |ψ〉2. Indeed, if these two states are localized in two different dis-
joint compartments, like in the initial situation of the Gibbs thought experiment,
they will be orthogonal. Under unitary evolution (as in the case of an ideal gas)
this orthogonality will be preserved in time, and ideal yes-no experiments can in
principle always provide a definitive answer about the origin of the one-particle
state we are dealing with. This can be exploited by a smart demon to build up an
entropy of mixing, with the help of an analogue of a semi-permeable membrane.
It is easy to see that the distinguishability that is vital here will remain the same
if we are dealing with a 2N-particles state, describing N particles to the left and
N to the right (before the removal of a partition). It will be possible in this case to
define mutually orthogonal N-particles states in the respective compartments, and
these will remain orthogonal under unitary evolution.
In other words, if we think of particles in the way just sketched, the situa-
tion with respect to distinguishability in principle is not fundamentally different
in quantum mechanics from the one in classical mechanics: even if distinguishing
trajectories are not clearly defined, there is still orthogonality of states and a cor-
responding distinguishability. The presence or absence of an entropy of mixing in
this case only depends on whether we are actually going to discriminate.
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In the end we can only agree with van Kampen’s statement ([10, p. 311]) that
in the case of ideal gases the Gibbs paradox is not different in quantum mechanics
than in classical mechanics.
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